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When confronted with animals, Western subjects inevitably cast themselves in the superior 
role of knowing subjects who take for granted that the whole natural world is knowable. 
Occasionally, though, in descriptions of encounters between humans and animals disturb that 
complacency. These strange encounters occasion perplexity concerning the status and the 
limits of human knowledge. They invite us to query not so much what we know about 
animals but rather what animals force us to (ac)know(ledge) that we want to ignore, or in 
other words, what is hidden from us in the act of knowing. After looking at the ways in which 
two accounts of confrontations with cats pose this problem, we will examine a series of texts 
by American writers that explore the gap that our culture opens between humans and animals. 
 
One such encounter concerns a strange phenomenon occurring in a Rhode Island hospital, 
discussed in the New England Journal of Medicine and subsequently reported in the popular 
press. It concerns Oscar, one of several cats that reside in the Steere House Nursing & 
Rehabilitation Center in Providence. The New England Journal of Medicine article explains 
how the normally aloof cat chooses to curl up beside patients a few hours before their deaths. 
At the time of the article’s publication, Oscar had predicted more than 25 patient deaths and 
was felt to be so reliable that staff began to alert families when a patient received Oscar’s 
special attention.  
 
A number of possible interpretations have been proposed to make sense of this unusual 
occurrence, yet none has been accepted as conclusive1. The production of scientific 
explanations seems designed to compensate the doctors’ inability to understand something 
that an animal senses “instinctively”2. The scientific community’s response tries to address 
the feeling of perplexity that Oscar’s aberrant behavior inspires. It does not match the usual 
feline profile—friendly, sometimes distant, but always inferior. This cat takes initiatives, 
intervenes in domains that belong to the experts. He takes an interest in matters that do not 
concern him and what’s more that are mysterious to humans. What does he know about us 
that we don’t? Why is he interested in us only at death’s door? 
 
                                                
1 A recent article in the Providence Journal reports that David Dosa’s best theory has to do with ketones; 
however, the article points out that this doesn’t resolve the enigma: “They’re biochemicals with a distinct smell 
that is created when the body’s cells begin to degenerate, easily detectable by a cat with its keen sense of smell. 
But why is Oscar — and only Oscar — attracted to it?” (quoted in Rourke). At the same time, Dosa expresses a 
curious form of elation at discovering the limits of his knowledge: ““My own intellectual vanity made it easier 
for me to reject the notion that some errant feline could know more than we as medical staff did,” Dosa writes. “I 
felt strangely elated by the notion that I could be completely wrong.”” (quoted in Rourke).  
2 Instinct is a problematic concept that denies our link with animals by refusing the similarity in those behaviors 
that we have in common by asserting that they cannot claim them as humans do. The circularity of this argument 
is obvious. 
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An implicit conjecture hovers above this puzzling occurrence: in spite of science, there are 
zones of knowledge that are opaque to human intelligence, or, maybe more frustratingly, 
ways of knowing to which we are not admitted. The strange event is not so much notable in 
itself as for the threat it poses to our ability to account for the world. An article in Le Monde 
Magazine relaying the American story reaffirms cultural assumptions by suggesting that the 
whole episode could be just a scam3. The French newspaper marks its difference on this 
particular point. But in fact, it puts the last touch to the general atmosphere of denial 
surrounding the incident—the whole thing is not credible and the newspaper comments 
ironically on what to believe and what to dismiss as ridiculous. The editors of Le Monde 
know better in their willingness not to know any more. The paradox evoked superficially by 
the journalists is taken up by Derrida on a more epistemologically sound basis.  
  
In the introductory chapter of his last book, L’animal que donc je suis, Jacques Derrida dares 
to explore the questions that Le Monde ignores. Derrida’s reflections on his cat complement 
and reverse the Oscar episode; the philosopher is more interested in questioning his own 
certitudes than in speculating about his cat’s knowledge. He asks what human knowledge is 
worth in the eyes of an other-than-human living creature. The capacity to reason supposedly 
distinguishes humans from animals and defines humanity. But how do we know that animals 
do not think? Isn’t it begging the question to place the human difference in something that we 
cannot prove that animals lack? Instead of a cat interfering in human affairs, Derrida portrays 
an elderly philosopher exposed naked to the gaze of his cat. The encounter between man and 
cat no longer concerns the inexplicable powers of an exceptional animal but the disquieting 
experience of meeting non-human eyes. Although the situation is different, the feeling of 
malaise persists; only it is induced by Derrida’s questioning mind and more minutely 
analyzed by him. Naked in front of his cat, he is no longer the acclaimed philosopher; his 
knowledge and his mind’s acumen count for nothing in the eyes of the familiar creature. The 
exposure to another animal puts his philosophical knowledge in jeopardy but at the same time 
opens it to a form of renewal or assessment. He humorously declares himself ready for the 
Apocalypse, for the “unveiling and the verdict” [Our translation]4. He discovers himself 
through the animal’s eyes: 
 
Like all bottomless gazes, like the eyes of the other, this so-called “animal” gaze lets me see the abyssal 
limit of the human: the inhuman or anhuman, the ends of man, in other words the crossing of the limits at 
which man dares to introduce himself to himself, calling himself thus by the name which he believes he 
gives himself [our translation]5. 
 
We want to place the following study under the double aegis of the highly charged notion of 
“les fins de l’homme” (the French “fins” being interpretable as aims-ends-finality-limits-
extinction, all in one), and the no less intense vision of the abyss (both bottomless chasm and 
pre-Creation chaos). What limits must humans cross or forgo crossing in order to hold their 
own in front of an animal? What is human and what is beyond human? Encounters with 
animals can be definitional in the sense that they confront humans with confusing borders 
where they perceive what lies beyond the limits of their nature, without the consolation of 
knowing where they stand. This is the initial position that Derrida adopts in L’animal que 
donc je suis. He then proceeds to review some major texts about animals in the philosophical 
                                                
3 “Plus que la mort, ce chat-là a tout l’air de sentir l’arnaque” (Le Monde Magazine 14). The article was the 
starting point of this essay, since its editorial smugness urged further investigation. 
4 “Je suis comme un enfant prêt pour l’apocalypse […] le dévoilement et le verdict” (Derrida 30). 
5 “Comme tout regard sans fond, comme les yeux de l’autre, ce regard dit “animal” me donne à voir la limite 
abyssale de l’humain: l’inhumain ou l’anhumain, les fins de l’homme, à savoir le passage des frontières depuis 
lequel l’homme ose s’annoncer à lui-même, s’appelant ainsi du nom qu’il croit se donner” (Derrida 30). 
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literature, including, more extensively, Heidegger in his last chapter, to conclude that they 
bring no final answer as to where we stand in relation to animals. Our knowledge is 
unavailing when it comes to certain situations in existence, death and dying most prominently 
among them. He insists that the whole “question of being” or of the “ontological difference” 
needs to be radically reinterpreted6. This conclusion is infinitely touching and honest but it is 
also an (inevitable?) evasion. 
 
Human beings are clearly incapable of meeting other species on their terms. Inevitably, we 
process animals and the world in the image-making factory of our cultural system. We 
convert whatever we consider as outside the limits of the human in terms of our personal or 
collective needs. Various ontological (or species-specific) a priori make the conversion not 
only easy but also conceptually justified. In the naturalistic perspective identified by 
Descola7, animals are seen as different from humans, as less than us. We assume that they 
lack what we have as our cultural heritage: the capacity to represent our own predicament. We 
see them as guided by instincts that prevent them from availing themselves of the capacity to 
weigh alternatives and choose among them. Consequently, we consider ourselves as 
responsible for them, and we justify our stewardship over animals by proclaiming our 
benevolence. Although this conception is ingrained in the Western consciousness, new 
developments in biology and ethology suggest that animals are capable of building conceptual 
universes. Whether we accept the older or the more recent conception, it is clear that 
encounters between humans and animals are like blind dates in which both parties respond 
according to pre-defined scenarios, and consequently that direct comprehension is impossible. 
 
If von Uexkhul is right that human and other than human animals inhabit distinct though 
intersecting umweldts, whatever is situated outside or beyond our respective world pictures is 
inaccessible, or rather the moment we attempt to comprehend other animals, we automatically 
reconvert them into our own system. Yet what is intriguing in the literature on animals is the 
way in which they are seen to possess, and sometimes surpass, distinctive human capacities, 
while strangely altering and transmogrifying them. Animals are like us and yet not like us; as 
such, they appear as teasing enigmas that beg to be deciphered. This is the origin of Derrida’s 
inquiry and the cause of the discomfort that is often felt in the presence of animals. Although 
culturally manacled in our relations with non-humans, we instinctively sense that what lives 
beyond our human sphere is crucial to our survival, if only because the “beyond” can become 
a potential threat. The ecological problem is of course initially posed in these terms. Oscar 
and Derrida’s cat raise another question that is less frequently evoked. As Derrida justly 
perceives, animal encounters confront us with the imperious necessity to legitimize our 
culture, our knowledge of the world, and our status as human beings. 
 
Those enigmatic cats not only reveal the limits of our knowledge but they suggest also that it 
is not an endowment that we acquire, accumulate and transfer, but something that supports or 
validates our existence. Without knowledge, we are naked, or perhaps we have always been 
naked. Without knowledge we become non-existent. As the story of Oscar shows, when it 
comes to confronting death, one of the most basic facts of existence, we are defenseless or in 
a position scarcely more favorable than animals. Both Oscar’s story and Derrida’s cat seem to 
demonstrate that our culture, our self-justifying image factory, is an extremely complex 
construction designed to make us forget or avoid conceptualizing our mortality. Death is 
                                                
6 “L’enjeu, naturellement, je ne le cache pas, est tellement radical qu’il y va de la “différence ontologique”, de la 
“question de l’être”, de toute l’armature du discours heideggérien” (Derrida 219). 
7 In Par-delà nature et culture Descola distinguishes naturalism from three other ways of conceiving one’s 
relation to the world: totemism, animism and analogism. 
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always under erasure; in other words, we conceptualize in order not to think about it. 
Nevertheless, certain circumstances cause anthropocentric schemata to malfunction. In 
relating extreme or unusual encounters with animals, certain American writers succeed in 
opening up a breach in the fortifications of our anthropocentric knowledge. 
  
Barry Lopez’s essay “A Presentation of Whales” is an example of a text that shatters our 
pretensions to mastery through knowledge. It relates the circumstances following the 
discovery of forty-one sperm whales stranded on a stretch of the Oregon coast in 1979. The 
essay recounts the varied reactions of government officials, the scientific community, the 
press, and the public to the deaths of these massive animals. No one seems able to furnish a 
satisfactory response. Rather than taking a stand or adopting a theory about the event, the 
essay depicts a series of unconnected scenes and relays different accounts of the event. In 
some passages, it reproduces the montage effect of a documentary film: 
 
By midnight, the curious and the awed were crowded on the beach, cutting the night with flashlights. 
Drunks, ignoring the whales’ sudden thrashing, were trying to walk up and down on their backs. A collie 
barked incessantly; flash cubes burst at the huge, dark forms. Two men inquired about reserving some of 
the teeth, for scrimshaw. A federal agent asked police to move people back, and the first mention of 
disease was in the air. Scientists arrived with specimen bags and rubber gloves and fishing knives. 
Greenpeace members, one dressed in a bright orange flight suit, came with a large banner. A man 
burdened with a television camera labored over the foredune after them. They wished to tie a rope to one 
whale’s flukes, to drag it back into the ocean. The police began to congregate with the scientists, looking 
for a rationale to control the incident. (Lopez, 119-120) 
 
This series of short declarative sentences describing the spectators’ reactions illustrates the 
inadequacy of socio-cultural codes in the face of the colossal demonstration of mortality. In 
the absence of authorial comment, no attitude seems to have preference over another. No one, 
from the drunks to the scientists, from the environmentalists to the police has a useful reply to 
the whales’ obvious distress. Even the best-intentioned actions are shown to be ludicrously 
inadequate, even somehow indecent. The human community turns the whales into objects, 
into news, into scientific data, and finally, into waste for disposal. In dealing with the whales’ 
vulnerable flesh, the humans seem increasingly inhumane. All the reactions, from science to 
sensationalistic journalism, are like so many screens erected to protect onlookers from a 
glaring yet unacceptable truth. 
  
Just what is being presented to the onlookers, and by extension to readers, in “A Presentation 
of Whales” ? The choice of the intriguing title suggests that Lopez’s essay wants to do much 
more than simply relate an event. The primary meaning of “presentation” is a gift, offered in a 
formal ceremony. But the event cannot be justified as a valuable opportunity for gathering 
scientific data, for the essay places this normally laudable human pursuit on a par with other 
forms of acquisition: 
 
 The temptation to possess—a Polaroid of oneself standing over a whale, a plug of flesh removed with a 
penknife, a souvenir squid beak plucked deftly from an exposed intestine by a scientist—was almost 
palpable in the air (Lopez, 129). 
  
A presentation is also a display, a revelation of presence. The whales’ stranding links the 
gruesome evidence of mortality—the colossal bodies being dissected with chain saws, the 
gallons of blood, the innards strewn on the beach—to evocations of mystery: “No one knows 
why whales strand” (Lopez, 132); “The general mystery is enhanced by specific mysteries” 
(Lopez, 123). Lopez charges the stranding of the whales with numinous or inexpressible 
meaning. Some of the witnesses to the scene are moved and troubled, yet unable to explain or 
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respond adequately to their discomfort. A graduate student working at the scene recounts how 
experiencing a live whale’s reaction to the dissection of his dead neighbor “broke scientific 
concentration and brought with it a feeling of impropriety” (Lopez, 139). A law enforcement 
officer who commands a man splashing cool water on one of the whales to move away asks 
himself, “Why is there no room for the decency of this gesture?” (Lopez, 130). There is 
something very wrong, the essay suggests, in the refusal of acts of human decency to 
members of other species. The whales are not of our kind, and yet they are somehow our kin. 
In the face of the inhumanity of the treatment accorded them, they seem more human than 
man. Thus, yet another meaning hovers behind the word “presentation” in the essay’s title: 
man’s re-introduction to his kith and kin, an impression of being lost and reborn that dawns 
upon some of the hushed crowd: “there were hundreds who whispered to one each other, as if 
in a grove of enormous trees” (Lopez, 130). 
  
Some remarks made by Robert Pogue Harrison offer insight into the problem that Lopez 
treats obliquely. Having separated ourselves from the rest of the natural world in order to 
assert our human exceptionality, we suffer, according to Harrison, from “species loneliness” 
(Harrison, 428). Our language, our modes of representation, in short, our whole culture, both 
engender and compensate the distance that separates us from the world: “human beings, 
unlike other living species, live not in nature, but in their relation to nature” (Harrison, 426). 
Conceiving of ourselves as exceptional, we do not acknowledge the mortal necessity that 
binds us to the rest of the animal world: “Culture is not the allegory of nature; it is the 
ritualized institution of the irony that puts us at odds with nature. To say it otherwise, I am at 
odds with my death” (Harrison, 435). Culture is a construction that keeps us pacified and 
secure in the ignorance of our own deaths. The whales’ stranding presents onlookers with 
death on a massive scale8, while stripping them of the usual human forms of containing and 
concealing mortality. There is something obscene about it: something that should be hidden is 
exposed to view; something that is obvious cannot be acknowledged. 
  
Lopez’s essay seems to be searching for a language with which to respond to the whales’ 
stranding. It quotes different voices and adopts various styles, alternating passages of 
detached, factual, scientific notation, journalistic reportage, grotesque realism, and lyrical 
description. Finally, Lopez abandons the quest for the right kind of discourse. Those who 
might have found the words or the gesture are absent from the scene: 
 
  As far as I know, no novelist, no historian, no moral philosopher, no scholar of  Melville, no rabbi, no 
painter, no theologian had been on the beach. No one had thought to call them or to fly them in. At the 
end they would not have been allowed past the barricades (Lopez, 146). 
 
 Although not quite conceding that words are inadequate to respond to the event, the series of 
negations in the essay’s penultimate paragraph underlines the failure of available discourses 
to cope with the sea mammals’ deaths. The essay seems finally to give up the struggle for 
expression: “The whales made a sound, someone had said, like the sound a big fir makes 
breaking off the stump just as the saw is pulled away. A thin screech” (Lopez, 146). At this 
point the writer seems to withdraw, first by quoting an unnamed source (“someone had said”), 
and second by relaying a strange metaphor to evoke the whales’ last agony, substituting a tree 
for the huge creatures. The pulling away of the saw reminds us of the humans’ inability to 
succor the whales and their disregard for their deaths, as unmourned as the tree’s fall. The 
elliptical last line reduces the monumental animals to “a thin screech”—to the faint noise 
                                                
8 This adds another possible meaning to the title: presentation in the sense of making present something that 
humans cannot conceive of in time. 
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before a giant tree’s final crash—and lets it linger without any human response. 
 
The human difficulty in responding to death points to a crucial discrepancy between the act of 
knowing and our perception of our existential status: the two do not match. The ability to 
know does not prepare us for the act of existing and there is even a suspicion that they might 
be at variance. Our existence is justified and enhanced by knowledge but has in part to 
contend with it. At the same time, paradoxically, we have founded our humanity on our 
ability to acquire a clear perception of our existential status, to think our existence, according 
to the Cartesian cogito. In Being and Time Heidegger opens an escape route by redefining the 
link between knowing and being. For Heidegger, human beings, as part of Da-sein, never 
acquire full knowledge of their existential situation because they are distracted by care which 
keeps them immersed in the world always “being ahead of” themselves and condemns them 
to a state of unwholeness (Heidegger, 1996, 219). We saw in Derrida’s meditation or in 
Oscar’s case and in Lopez’s essay that the whole of our knowledge, culture and cognitive 
acumen are at stake in the confrontation with death. Da-sein’s return to wholeness consists in 
anticipating death. Only in the perspective of that improbable reality is it placed in a position 
of existing to the full. In being-toward-the-end, “Da-sein discloses itself to itself with regard 
to its most extreme possibility” (Heidegger, 1996, 242).  
 
Yet Heidegger’s conception of being-toward-death is strictly personal and even provocatively 
individualistic: “Insofar as it ‘is,’ death is always essentially my own” (Heidegger, 1996, 
223), whereas the texts that we examine evince a relational, face-to-face dimension. The 
deaths of other beings are indispensable analogues that trigger an oblique and intuitive 
perception of what we cannot conceptualize. This idea has been theorized by Lévinas in God, 
Death, and Time: “In every death is shown the nearness of the neighbor, and the 
responsibility that the approach of proximity moves or agitates” (Lévinas, 17). The 
individual’s death is only significant in the way it links him to others. Death and dying are 
relational and sometimes communal experiences that create a sense of proximity and a bond 
of responsibility9. 
  
The encounters with animals we have looked at so far call into question any claims for human 
exceptionality. Hence, it is difficult to integrate into our study of animal encounters 
Heidegger’s well-known distinction in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, 
Finitude, Solitude between the three orders of existence: “The stone is worldless, the animal is 
poor in world, man is world-forming” (Heidegger, 1995,186). Even if we ignore the fact that 
the distinction reopens the now contested argument for man’s exceptionalism, it places the 
animal on an inferior footing as deficient precisely in that in which we would distinctively 
excel. The impression derived from the texts examined so far is that, on the contrary, on rare 
but intense occasions animals force us to discover our common engagement with the world. 
These occasions give us an opportunity to affirm our real nature not as solitary individuals but 
as members of a community that includes all other existing beings. In front of animals we are 
both revealed and threatened, and also released from human limitations.  
  
Confrontation with wild animals—because they are rare and often intense—can shock us out 
of reassuring preconceptions. They can relay intimations that somehow bypass the confusing 
maze of representations. Again these exceptional realizations should be distinguished from 
the common cultural consolations expressed in threadbare motifs like “memento mori”, which 
                                                
9 There is a possible similarity between Lévinas’s the ‘nearness’ concept and Deleuze’s “voisinnage” or 
Derrida’s “être serré”, discussed below. 
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advises the acceptance of death, or the contrary theme of “carpe diem”, which urges the 
affirmation of life in spite of the inevitability of death. The kind of existential moment that 
encounters with animals prompt is at the same time more primordial and even brutal. This 
type of experience is rather like the feeling one sometimes has when leaning over the handrail 
on a very high bridge to look into the void, or the sensations that people associate with bungee 
jumping or Russian roulette. In both cases, one has the impression that one is just a step away 
from accomplishing something momentous because irreparable, as if forfeiting one’s life 
could become a formidable life experience. These extreme occurrences suggest that our 
perception of life is entwined with our perception of death, danger or destruction, that one 
offsets and counterbalances the other, that accepting one involves giving in to the other and 
that existence without both is lived in vain. This is the existential complex that we explore 
now in two literary representations of life and death encounters, one by James Dickey and the 
other by Annie Dillard. 
 
In his poem, “The Heaven of Animals”, James Dickey represents the place animals go after 
death as the identical counterpart of the places they inhabited in life. In life and death there is 
no distinction; both states represent the absolute plenitude of existence: 
 
Here they are. The soft eyes open. 
If they have lived in a wood 
It is a wood. 
If they have lived on plains 
It is grass rolling 
Under their feet forever. 
 
Having no souls, they have come,  
Anyway, beyond their knowing.  
Their instincts wholly bloom 
And they rise. 
The soft eyes open. (Dickey, 78-79) 
 
The pattern of echoes in these lines creates heaven as a mirror image of earth. The poem 
suggests that unburdened by “souls” or knowledge, animals are already in bliss, in a life given 
over to instinct. Nonetheless, it is death that makes this existential fullness possible:  
 
For some of these, 
It could not be the place 
It is, without blood. 
These hunt, as they have done, 
But with claws and teeth grown perfect, 
 
More deadly than they can believe.  
They stalk more silently, 
And crouch on the limbs of trees,  
And their descent 
Upon the bright backs of their prey 
 
May take years 
In a sovereign floating of joy. 
And those that are hunted 
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Know this as their life, 
Their reward: to walk 
 
Under such trees in full knowledge 
Of what is in glory above them, 
And to feel no fear, 
But acceptance, compliance. 
Fulfilling themselves without pain 
 
At the cycle’s center, 
They tremble, they walk 
Under the tree, 
They fall, they are torn, 
They rise, they walk again. (Dickey, 79) 
 
The poem’s two movements complement and match each other—the transparent living of the 
opening stanzas is simply the counterpart of life lived in the donation and acceptance of death. 
The expression of animal instinct in the relation between hunter and prey is declared to be 
“full” and “fulfilled” knowledge. The poem depicts a timeless moment “at the cycle’s center” 
that embraces dualities and overrides the conventional life and death binary.  
  
As in all binaries (culture/nature, male/female, mind/body, etc.), the second term is the 
inferior element; thus, death is conceived as “non-life”. If accepting the binary implies the 
inauthentic existence denounced by Heidegger, then acceptance of death in life or dying into 
living, as dreamt by the speaker in “The Heaven of Animals”, means fulfillment expressed in 
two modalities. The first describes the complete effacement of identity and thus total 
coincidence with the world. This is not the unmindful “wordlessness” that Heidegger 
associated with the mineral order, but the expression of the world’s substance through a 
being’s own life: “If they have lived in a wood/ It is a wood”. The places where animals lived 
become complete thanks to their inhabitants’ transparent existence. Alternatively but not 
differently, existence is fulfilled by keeping the two principles of life and death in an eternally 
renewed embrace, as in the second part of the poem. Shown in slow motion, the Dance of 
Death becomes the apotheosis of life.  
 
Why does animal existence make the realization of the connectedness of life and death more 
probable? The situations created by Oscar or Derrida’s cat or the encounters with wild 
animals introduce an essential difference. These animals come to us and look at us without 
words. We have no words in return to justify our presence or question theirs. When they look 
at us we perceive our own image in their gaze, but that image is not identifiable. The 
impression of being seen seeing is sometimes complicated by the perception of a similar 
perplexity in the animal’s eyes, so that our image is fractured by its own incomprehension. 
Existence is no longer distanced and identified through representation but presented raw in 
the alien gaze. It becomes inscrutable and, as Derrida senses, decisive for the understanding 
of our status. Punning in his book’s title on the verb “to be” (je suis can mean both I am, and I 
follow), Derrida analyses with extreme sophistication the various aspects of this encounter as 
being with (“l’être-avec”) and being close to (“l’être-serré”) the animal (Derrida 27). The 
human subject loses his status as individualized entity and becomes sufficiently 
depersonalized as to be able to exist in close proximity with another being. At the same time, 
Derrida describes the dismaying impression of being considered from the point of view of the 
absolute other, “l’autre absolu” (Derrida 28). These two sets of remarks do not match. How 
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can the animal be considered as the absolute other and yet be close to us? This is only a 
paradox in appearance since it is only when a being has abandoned all pretence to 
distinctiveness that it can experience a feeling of proximity with its neighbor. “Il 
m’entoure”10, Derrida concludes significantly (Derrida 28). This is the kind of experience that 
Annie Dillard explores in her encounter with a weasel.  
  
“Living Like Weasels” begins conventionally enough with a reflection on some of the 
characteristics of the species and an assertion of their difference from humans: “A weasel is 
wild. Who knows what he thinks?” (Dillard, 11). Dillard relates two anecdotes from her 
reading about weasels to illustrate one of their most distinctive characteristics, the tenacity of 
their bite. The first concerns a naturalist bitten by an animal that refuses to let go: “and he had 
to walk half a mile to water, the weasel dangling from his palm, and soak him off like a 
stubborn label” (Dillard, 11). The metaphor illustrates the weasel’s sticking power, while at 
the same time humorously assimilating him to a familiar object. The second illustration is 
even more singular: 
 
 And once, says Ernest Thompson Seton—once, a man shot an eagle out of the sky. He examined the 
eagle and found the dry skull of a weasel fixed by the jaws to his throat. The supposition is that the eagle 
had pounced on the weasel and the weasel swiveled and bit as instinct taught him, tooth to neck, and 
nearly won. (Dillard, 12) 
 
At first the anecdote merely provokes questions about the relationship of hunter and prey. 
Later, Dillard returns to this story to explore its existential implications.  
  
Though they start the essay, Dillard claims that these odd pieces of information about weasels 
were gleaned after a personal encounter with one: “I had been reading about weasels because 
I saw one last week” (Dillard, 12). This observation is of a different order from the preceding 
ones. No longer the distanced object of scientific curiosity, the weasel is identified as a 
subject, capable of engaging with the speaker: “I startled a weasel who startled me, and we 
exchanged a long glance” (Dillard, 12). After setting the scene for the encounter in a long 
descriptive passage, Dillard returns to this glance, using her considerable resources as a writer 
to convey the impact of the moment: 
 
 Our look was as if two lovers, or deadly enemies, met unexpectedly on an overgrown path where each 
had been thinking of something else: a clearing blow to the gut. It was also a bright blow to the brain, or a 
sudden beating of brains, with all the charge and intimate grate of rubbed balloons. It emptied our lungs. 
It felled the forest, moved the fields, and drained the pond; the world dismantled and tumbled into that 
black hole of eyes (Dillard, 14). 
 
This moment of exchanging gazes with the weasel sweeps away all that has been experienced 
(or written before). The world of Tinker Creek, recreated in the text, disappears, reduced to a 
single point that connects the two beings, “the black hole of eyes”. This encounter sweeps 
away all other forms of knowledge to privilege a direct experience of being:  
 
 I tell you I’ve been in that weasel’s brain for sixty seconds and he was in mine. Brains are private 
places, muttering through unique and secret tapes—but the weasel and I both plugged into another tape 
simultaneously, for a sweet and shocking time. Can I help it if it was a blank? (Dillard, 14). 
 
During the minute in which they look at each other, words disappear; the tape running in the 
writer’s brain is suddenly no longer unique and personal, but blank. All remembered and 
                                                
10 The expression in French is ambiguous: it may signify “it encircles me” and “it surrounds me with affection”, 
but also maybe “it contains me”. 
10 
 
learned knowledge vanishes, as she lives for an instant like the weasel; she shares his mental 
space.  
  
For Dillard, “Living Like Weasels” means abandoning culture, foregoing the detachment 
from the world that gives rise to human consciousness and choosing instead to immerse 
oneself in existence: 
 
 The weasel lives in necessity and we live in choice, hating necessity and dying at the last ignobly in its 
talons. I would like to live as I should, as the weasel lives as he should. And I suspect that for me the way 
is like the weasel’s: open to time and death painlessly, noticing everything, remembering nothing, 
choosing the given with a fierce and pointed will ((Dillard, 15). 
 
“Living Like Weasels” also means recognizing the place of death in existence. The skull 
embedded in the eagle’s neck becomes a sign of the wild animal’s commitment to the 
embrace of both life and death in existence. Imitating the tenacious grip of the weasel’s jaws 
is seen as the entry to a heightened form of existence, “a dearer life”, that restores the 
continuity between life and death, figured here as the wild roses and the mud:  
 
I missed my chance. I should have gone for the throat. I should have lunged for that streak of white under 
the weasel’s chin and held on, held on through mud and into the wild rose, held on for a dearer life. We 
could live under the wild rose wild as weasels, mute and uncomprehending (Dillard, 15). 
 
In this fantasy of living as a weasel, Annie Dillard imagines crossing the species barrier to 
enter another realm of possibility. This psychic impulse replicates the “devenir-animal” that 
Deleuze and Guattari adumbrate in Mille Plateaux.  
 
Becomings-animal are basically of another power, since their reality resides not in an animal one imitates 
or to which one corresponds, but in themselves, in what suddenly sweeps us up and makes us become—a 
proximity, an indiscernibility that extracts a shared element from the animal far more effectively than any 
domestication, utilization, or imitation could: “the Beast” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, 307)11. 
 
What counts for them in humans’ metamorphoses into animals is the impulse toward 
something else, molecular living as opposed to molar individuated existence. Dillard admits 
to the urge toward a more intense form of being, but she pulls back. She thinks before lunging 
for the throat of existence. She is of two minds, a human living the dream of animal life, 
unable to give up the faculties that allow her to imagine that other life. The modals in the 
passage quoted above underline both the attraction of the fantasy and her rejection of it. 
Seeing animal existence as an either/or status that excludes her humanity, she cannot access 
the fluid state of “Becoming-animal”. For Dillard, to become animal would be to regress to a 
state “where the mind is single” (Dillard, 15), and her consciousness situates her elsewhere, 
on the human side of the divide. The moment of blankness experienced looking into the eyes 
of the weasel is like the writer’s horror of the blank page. She marks her distance from the 
weasel through the very act of writing about him: 
 
What does a weasel think about? He won’t say. His journal is tracks in clay, a 
spray of feathers, mouse blood and bone: uncollected, loose-leaf, and blown. 
 
                                                
11 Les devenirs-animaux sont d’abord d’une autre puissance, puisqu’ils n’ont pas leur réalité dans l’animal qu’on 
imiterait ou auquel on correspondrait, mais en eux-mêmes, dans ce qui nous prend tout d’un coup et nous fait 
devenir, un voisinage, une indiscernabilité, qui extrait de l’animal quelque chose de commun beaucoup plus que 
toute domestication, que toute utilisation, que toute imitation : “la Bête” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, 342). 
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The weasel records his existence with mute material substances—clay, feathers, blood and 
bone—that remain “uncollected” while Dillard imagines, reflects, writes, and gathers her 
work into volumes.  
 
All the texts that we have read so far, nonfiction prose, narration, poetry and even newspaper or 
review articles are various manners of tackling the problem of representing to others the strange 
encounters with animals that we have tried to characterize. Yet they are fraught with the following 
paradox—by addressing us in conventional codes, these texts normalize experiences that were 
inexpressible in the first instance. Dickey imagines an animal paradise from which humans are 
excluded, while Dillard’s text relates a fantasy of joining the animal world that has been safely 
textualized. Both texts offer equally improbable projections of the human-animal relation. Animal 
encounters confront humans with death in life and thereby hold out the promise of a fuller 
existence. Nonetheless, the texts we have looked at so far suggest that we habitually resist that 
form of knowing in order to hold onto our human difference. In the quest for liberation from the 
humans’ mental world, knowledge is an obstacle; it blocks the entry to animal heaven and checks 
the descent into pure animal nature.  
  
How can we foster an interactive perspective, resisting the impulse to take distance from the 
natural world? How can one overcome that “species loneliness” that Harrison identifies? Loren 
Eiseley seems to point the way in his suggestive essay, “The Judgment of the Birds”.  
  
To open up to the experience of animal existence, Eiseley first identifies a liminal space that blurs 
familiar human landmarks. He begins his essay by recalling that traditionally men have sent 
emissaries into the wilderness to gain insight, but Eiseley’s sites of revelation are not necessarily 
distant from human habitation: “Even in New York City there are patches of wilderness” (Eiseley, 
1957, 164). The essay moves from a Manhattan hotel room, to a path near the naturalist’s home, to 
a lonely stretch of the Badlands, to a mountain glade, to end on a sidewalk outside his home. The 
episodes related often take place at transitional moments, at dawn or dusk, when the subject 
hovers between sleep and waking. Insight comes not so much from frequenting isolated spaces as 
from opening the mind to alternative experiences and being receptive to the moment when “the 
mundane world gives way to quite another dimension” (Eiseley, 1957, 164). To give readers 
access to the alternative dimension of experience, Eiseley begins by representing the conditions 
that gave rise to the moments of insight; thus his essay proceeds through a series of frames that 
recreate or simulate these liminal places and moments. Then, to open the experience to readers he 
must refuse the temptation to provide closure; his challenge as a writer is to communicate while 
refraining from imposing an interpretation.  
  
In order to guide the reader away from conventional modes of thought, the essay’s paired 
opening scenes resemble inverted mirror images of each other. In the first, Eiseley looks 
down from the twentieth story of a hotel, “into a series of cupolas or lofts” (Eiseley, 1957, 
163). This bird’s-eye view gives him a vision of a flock of circling pigeons and he imagines 
for a moment that he is one of them: 
 
 As I crouched half asleep across the sill, I had a moment’s illusion that the world had changed in the 
night, as in some immense snowfall, and that if I were to leave, it would have to be as these other 
inhabitants were doing, by the window. I should have to launch out into that great bottomless void with 
the simple confidence of young birds reared high up there among the familiar chimney pots and 
interposed horrors of the abyss (Eiseley, 1957, 166). 
 
New York is turned upside down, so that the terra firma of the city streets becomes a 
“bottomless void” and the sky becomes a familiar element. Poised on the unstable boundary 
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between two worlds, Eiseley feels the urge to join the city’s “other inhabitants”. He is ready 
to leave the windowsill and launch out into world of the pigeons: “by the merest pressure of 
the fingers and a feeling for air, one might go away over the roofs. It is a knowledge, 
however, that is better kept to oneself” (Eiseley, 1957, 167). This secret knowledge of 
becoming a bird recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-animal”. It is a form of knowing 
that momentarily allows one to look beyond the boundaries of the human and, at the same 
time, to come very near to death. 
  
Unlike Dillard, though, Eiseley does not subject his urge to logical dissection. He keeps it in 
the realm of possibility by situating it in the in-between zone of the inexplicable:  
 
 To see from an inverted angle, however, is not a gift allotted merely to the human imagination. I have 
come to suspect that within their degree it is sensed by animals, though perhaps as rarely as among men. 
The time has to be right; one has to be, by chance or intention, upon the border of two worlds. And 
sometimes these two borders may shift or interpenetrate and one sees the miraculous.  
 I once saw this happen to a crow. (Eiseley, 1957, 167) 
 
The passage is shot through with words that introduce uncertainty (“perhaps”, “rarely”, 
“chance”, “may”, “the miraculous”). Part of the uncertainty of existing “on the border of two 
worlds” is that humans cannot pretend to have knowledge of the other side. Yet this is 
precisely the zone into which Eiseley’s essay ventures; hence, the necessity to create frames 
which permit our imaginative entry. He depicts a startling encounter with a crow as a moment 
when “the borders of our worlds had shifted” (Eiseley, 1957, 169). In a mirror image of 
Eiseley’s experience in the New York hotel, the crow accidentally encroaches on the 
boundary between avian and human worlds. Disoriented by a thick fog, the bird flies lower 
than usual, so that the naturalist appears to him as: “a man walking on air, desecrating the 
very heart of the crow kingdom” (Eiseley, 1957,169). By imagining himself in the crow’s 
mental world, Eiseley tries to ensure that readers do not revert to the normal binaries and 
hierarchies of human knowledge. He insists that birds and other animals have their own 
certainties. Once he has established this point, he can go on to suggest what animals can teach 
us.  
  
Three illustrations follow in the form of paradoxes or riddles. In the first the naturalist stands 
in the Badlands, a place where nothing seems to live or grow, at the end of a chilly autumn 
day. Suddenly, a flight of birds rushes across the sky:  
 
Across that desert of eroding clay and wind-worn stone they came with a faint, wild twittering that filled 
all the air about me as those tiny living bullets hurtled past into the night. 
 It may not strike you as a marvel. It would not perhaps, unless you stood in the middle of a dead world 
at sunset, but that was where I stood. Fifty million years lay under my feet, fifty million years of 
bellowing monsters moving in a green world now gone so utterly that its very light was traveling on the 
farther edge of space. The chemicals of all that vanished age lay about me in the ground (Eiseley, 1957, 
171). 
 
The naturalist asks us to imagine the place where he stands and to make the connection 
between the birds above and the dead fossils underfoot. Again, he creates an inverted mirror, 
for the birds are made of the same chemicals as the dead creatures. All that wild energy 
hurtles like “living bullets” into extinction. The birds are moving signs of the miracle of life 
in the midst of death. 
 
A similar insight comes from the episode that gives the essay its title. Waking up in a 
woodland glade, the unseen observer witnesses “a judgment on life” that “was not passed by 
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men” (Eiseley, 1957, 173). The sounds that wake him are the cries of protest emitted by birds 
whose nestling has been devoured by a raven. Other birds gather in the glade and begin to add 
their voices to the anguished complaint. Gradually, though, “as though some evil thing were 
being forgotten” (Eiseley, 1957, 175), the shrieks of distress change into a joyful chorus: 
“They sang because life is sweet and sunlight beautiful. They sang under the brooding 
shadow of the raven” (Eiseley, 1957, 175). The chiaroscuro effect of the scene recalls the 
other moments depicted in the essay. The animal world holds together contraries: light and 
dark, life and death. These elements are not hierarchical or separate, as in rational thought, but 
blended in indissociable continuity. 
  
In the final scene Eiseley offers a meta-literary comment on his method. Late in the year on 
the suburban street outside his house, he climbs a stepladder to examine a spider building her 
web in front of a street lamp. He begins to draw a moral from the scene, seeing her as “a great 
black and yellow embodiment of the life force, not giving up to either frost or stepladders” 
(Eiseley, 1957, 176). He compares her to a doomed but heroic warrior engaged in “our final 
freezing battle with the void” (Eiseley, 1957, 178). But finally he pulls back from 
explanations:  
 
It was better, I decided, for the emissaries returning from the wilderness, even if they were merely 
descending a stepladder, to record their marvel, not to define its meaning. In that way it would go echoing 
on through the minds of men, each grasping at that beyond out of which miracles emerge, and which, 
once defined, ceases to satisfy the human need for symbols (Eiseley, 1957, 178). 
 
Eiseley’s conclusion resonates with religious language, so that the naturalist seems like a 
latter-day prophet emerging from an experience with the numinous. However, he humorously 
undercuts this elevated image of himself with the fragmentary jottings in the style of field 
notes that conclude the essay. The indefinable “beyond out of which miracles emerge” is 
nothing more or less than the natural world, from which men are exiled because of their urge 
to master it through definitions. Instead, what he tries to promote through his writings is a 
different form of knowledge—what he calls “grasping at th[e] beyond” —which still implies 
a individual act of appropriation but does not necessarily predicate its conversion into existing 
social codes. Grasping places the emphasis on the endeavor rather than on the objective. In 
the same way, by multiplying perspectives on his animal encounters, Eiseley keeps us 
grasping, even sometimes groping for, and thus constructing for ourselves an image of what 
he calls the beyond. 
  
Animal encounters bring us to a strange border that is both an opportunity and a leap in the 
dark. In their presence, our existence no longer speaks for itself; we have to identify 
ourselves—to say who we are and where we stand. We may assert the dominion of our 
science or the omnipotence of our knowledge; we may try to leap over the borders that divide 
us and indulge in fantasy worlds like Dickey or Dillard; however, the question of how and 
where we conceive the demarcation between us and them persists. Is it an impassable limit 
that divides incommensurable realms or just a “multiple, overfolded border” that needs to be 
explored, as Derrida suggests?12 Is it a closed border between territories or a zone of 
exchange? Is there a possibility of fusion or interchange between different orders or does the 
barrier itself bring out those differences? The texts that we have studied remain undecided but 
                                                
12 “La discussion mérite de commencer quand il s’agit de déterminer le nombre, la forme, le sens, la structure et 
l’épaisseur feuilletée de cette limite abyssale, de ces bordures, de cette frontière plurielle et surpliée” (Derrida, 
52). The discussion can validly begin when it deals with deciding the number, form, meaning, structure and 
layered thickness of that abyssal limit, of those edges, of that multiple, overfolded border [our translation].  
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they hover round these questions, and their hesitation sketches out a maze of lines more 
convincing than all the divisions that we usually conceive. 
  
What is clear is that our knowledge and our very cognitive makeup are disrupted and 
invalidated by these encounters. They cannot cope with the challenge that animals issue. We 
do not know how to interpret the forms of intuitive communion that engross and inhibit our 
power of comprehension except through reactions of escape or emotional empathy. These 
unsettling signs of perplexity are particularly pronounced in situations in which death is 
involved and which adumbrate under the divide between species a certain overlap between 
our respective conditions. Death is life’s shadow companion that we refuse to recognize. 
Animals, on the contrary, seem to confront it with simplicity and draw their energy from it. 
  
Born of denial, a feeling of malaise arises from the texts that we have examined, including 
Dillard’s and Dickey’s, in which momentary euphoria is like a paroxysmal form of anguish. 
Yet this feeling of malaise is not a handicap, a curse or even a challenge, it is the very tenor of 
human existence which has to find sustenance in a constant dilemma: either we answer the 
call that animals send from the other side of the barrier of species and we abandon our 
humanity, or, by cutting ourselves off from those fellow beings, we assert our human 
difference and we lose contact with the bedrock of existence. There is no escape from that 
existential malaise but we can confront it tangentially, for example through the kaleidoscopic 
visions that Eiseley offers in ”The Judgment of Birds”. Multiplying the various reflections in 
the mirror of experience permits a degree of insight, a vague feeling of release. Literature can 
help us avoid the disillusion of science, but it need not condemn us to another form of 
desperation, as Eiseley seems to fear: 
 
[…] I abandon science disillusioned and turn to literature like the bull at the wall, realizing at last that the 
esoterics and magicians, if foolish, at least have known the other road was hopeless and that something 
more desperate had to be tried—but what? (Eiseley 1987 135). 
 
As opposed to scientific knowledge, literature leaves room for Eiseley’s “But what?” and its 
specific function is to keep the question open. 
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